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ANTITRUST STANDING: CONGRESS
RESPONDS TO ILLINOIS BRICK
MORRIS B. HOFFMAN*
Broad private enforcement traditionally has been viewed as a key to
the effectiveness of the antitrust laws. But judicially tailored notions of
standing have always been at odds with this underlying enforcement
policy, and the resulting antitrust standing doctrines, therefore, have
become particularly twisted and confusing. Part of the problem has
been the Supreme Court's reluctance to enter the field-leaving it to
the lower federal courts to develop the bulk of the doctrine' with no
shortage of inconsistency. When the Court has entered the picture, as it
did last term in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,2 it has not appreciably
cleared the analytical waters.3
Despite the doctrinal confusion, the Court's message to ultimate con-
sumers is now unmistakable: Do not look to the federal antitrust laws
when you are forced to pay prices inflated by remote antitrust violators.
But Congress and the lower federal courts have been proceeding down
quite a different road-one with fewer procedural barriers to consumer
antitrust recovery.' One year before Illinois Brick, Congress passed the
* Law clerk to the Honorable Charles D. Pierce, Colorado Court of Appeals. B.A., 1974,
J.D., 1977, University of Colorado.
1. There are a few notable exceptions; the validity of the passing-on doctrine and the propri-
ety of parens patriae suits have both received the Court's recent, if unfruitful, attention. See text
accompanying notes 38-55 & 107-14 infra.
2. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
3. The principal thesis of this article is that the Illinois Brick Court, in attempting to reach a
result contrary to the clear intent of Congress, see note 4 infra, misapplied two fundamental stand-
ing notions: injury in fact and proximity. See text accompanying notes 144-53 infra.
4. The tate a tte between the Court and Congress over the question of ultimate consumer
antitrust standing has turned into a fascinating institutional subplot quite apart from the substan-
tive issues involved. It also raises some serious questions about the fundamental efficiency of
these two branches of government when dealing with open-ended legislation like the Sherman
and Clayton Acts.
The Court's ventures into uncharted territory of antitrust standing, most notably in Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), and more recently in Illinois Brick, have followed a tight
script. First, the Court pays institutional homage to the intent of Congress. Next, it explores that
intent, which is often expressed by recent legislation, and dismisses it as not dispositive of the
issues at hand. Finally, the Court reaches a result contrary to the basic legislative objectives and
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Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Procedures Improvements Act,5 which
purports to bypass certain standing difficulties by sanctioning state
parens patriae suits.6 And the courts of appeals, particularly the Sixth
Circuit, have adopted increasingly liberal concepts of proximity, which
all but eliminate it as a standing barrier.7
Senate Bill 1874,8 currently on the floor, would sweep away great
portions of this inter-branch development and would essentially restore
the law of antitrust standing to its pre-1960 condition. Although this
solution has the attractive feature of eliminating many of the inconsis-
tencies that have developed over the years, it poses serious due process
and separation of powers problems9 and even more serious enforce-
ment problems."0 Accordingly, this article will assess the impact of S.
1874 in light of the history and development of standing notions in
antitrust law.
I. A PRE-ILLINoIs BRICK HISTORY OF ANTITRUST STANDING
From the beginning the antitrust laws contemplated private enforce-
makes a parting salute to Congress by inviting them to change the announced rule. A criticism of
this melodrama formed the theme of Justice Blackmun's dissent in Illinois Brick:
I think the plaintiffs-respondents in this case, which they now have lost, are the victims
of an unhappy chronology. If Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392
U.S. 481 (1968), . . . had not preceded this case, and were it not "on the books," I am
positive that the Court today would be affirming, perhaps unanimously, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals. The policy behind the Antitrust Acts and all the signs point in that
direction, and the conclusion in favor of indirect purchasers who could demonstrate in-
jury would almost be compelled.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 tells us all that is needed
as to Congress' present understanding of the Acts. Nevertheless, we must now await still
another statute which, as the Court acknowledges, . .. the Congress may adopt. One
regrets that it takes so long and so much repetitious effort to achieve, and have this Court
recognize, the obvious congressional aim.
431 U.S. at 765-66. Justice Blackmun's prediction of a statute in response to Illinols Brick is close
to realization. S. 1874, which left the Judiciary Committee in May 1978 and at this writing is
before the full Senate, purports to overrule Illinois Brick. See text accompanying notes 163-78
infra.
5. Pub. L. No. 94-435, §§ 4C-4H, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15n
(1976)).
6. See text accompanying notes 129-34 infra.
7. See Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975) (discussed in text ac-
companying notes 79-90 infra).
8. S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3-5 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 163-78
i.fra).
9. See text accompanying notes 170-77 infra.
10. See text accompanying note 178 infra.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/3
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ment. Section 7 of the original Sherman Act1 gave private citizens the
right to sue for treble damages. Since section 7 was applicable only to
violations of the Sherman Act, it was superseded in 1914 by section 4 of
the Clayton Act, 2 which extended the private right of action.' 3 There
is no explicit limitation in the language of section 4: "[A]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States. . .and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained . ,,. 4 Despite this rather unqualified language, the federal
courts soon began to weave various standing requirements into the
fabric of section 4.
There are traditional constitutional and nonconstitutional reasons
for this judicial limiting. The constitutional justification is embodied in
Article III: Federal courts have jurisdiction only when faced with a
"case or controversy."" Beyond that, practical nonconstitutional con-
siderations of judicial efficiency dictate that courts place some proxim-
ity limitations on prospective antitrust plaintiffs. 6
There are also some justifications for limiting section 4 that are
peculiar to the nature of the private treble damage action. The risk of
multiplicity of suits is particularly great; not only do anticompetitive
actions reverberate throughout the economy giving rise to an unlimited
number of potential plaintiffs, but those plaintiffs can join the civil
bandwagon after the government has proved a criminal violation. 17
There also seems to be a judicial hesitancy to punish minor antitrust
11. Ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
12. Ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
13. Id.
14. Id. Some commentators have even suggested that the drafters of the original treble dam-
ages provision intended that there be no standing limitation to private recovery. See Berger &
Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrnt Standing, 86 YALE LJ. 809, 812 n.9 (1977).
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
16. See Pollack, Standing to Sue, Remoteness ofInury, and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32 AN-
TrriUST L.J. 5, 9 (1966).
17. This bandwagon effect is made possible by § 5(i) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(i)
(1976), under which the statute of limitations on private actions is tolled by a government pro-
ceeding, either civil or criminal.
Two recent cases may have the effect of diminishing the bandwagon phenomenon. In United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978), the Court held that criminal convictions under
the Sherman Act require a showing that the defendant acted knowingly. If this means fewer crimi-
nal convictions, then private antitrust plaintiffs will have fewer bandwagons on which to jump. In
Greyhound Corp. v. Mount Hood Stages, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2370 (1978), the Court gave a restrictive
interpretation to the term "proceeding" under § 5(i), holding that the statute of limitations was not
tolled when the federal government intervened in ICC proceedings.
Number 3]
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offenses by awarding treble damages to remote plaintiffs. These consti-
tutional and nonconstitutional considerations have given rise to a
number of traditional standing limitations.
A. '4ny Person" and 'nything Forbidden in the Antitrust Laws"
The initial interpretation of section 4's reference to "any person" suf-
fering any injury by reason of "anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws" illustrates the contradiction that plagues the doctrine of antitrust
standing. Courts gave very different meanings to the two "anys."
"Any person" has been given its usual meaning; it includes natural and
corporate plaintiffs."8 But the courts of appeals were divided over
whether "anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" included merger vi-
olations under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Eighth Circuit origi-
nally took the position that a plaintiff making a section 7 challenge to a
proposed merger lacked standing because he could not show present
injury in fact.9 However, it soon retreated from that position.20 Last
term, the Supreme Court settled the matter by holding that section 7
merger violations are actionable under section 4.21
B. Injury in Fact
Section 4 requires that the private plaintiff "be injured. 22 The
courts have faced three issues related to this requirement: (1) Does sec-
tion 4 contemplate purely private injury, or must some "public" injury
also be shown? (2) What kinds of injuries are actionable? and (3) Is a
middleman who passes on losses "injured"?
18. But see United States v. Cooper Corp., 302 U.S. 600, 606-14 (1940), in which the
Supreme Court held that the United States is not a "person" within the meaning of the original § 7
of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). In 1955 Congress added § 4A to the Clayton
Act to avoid the Cooper problem. "Whenever the United States is hereafter injured in its busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefor...
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover actual damages by it sustained and
the cost of suit." Pub. L. No. 137, 69 Stat. 282 (1955) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976)). Re-
cently, the Court decided that a foreign nation is a "person" entitled to sue under § 4, Pfizer, Inc.
v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), though S. 1874 would also overrule this decision.
See note 163 infra.
19. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 728 n.3 (8th Cir. 1964).
See also Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963).
For a discussion of the requirement of injury in fact, see text accompanying notes 22-61 Infra.
20. Carlson Co. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 507 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1974).
21. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (discussed in note 90
infra).
22. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
[Vol. 1978:529
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/3
Number 3] ANTITRUST STANDING
1. Purely Private Injury
Initially, courts interpreted section 4 to require a showing of public
and private injury. For example, in Kinnear- Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil
& Refning Co. ,23 the Fifth Circuit dismissed a private action, stating
that "[t]he very foundation of the right of a private suitor to [treble
damages] is the violation of public rights protected by the Act. .... I
It is now clear, however, after Klor's v. Broadway Hale Stores,25 that
a purely private loss is actionable under section 4. Thus in Radiant
Burners v. Peoplev' Gas, Light & Coke Co.,26 the Court held that a com-
plaint-which alleged that defendant gas company refused to supply
gas to burners manufactured by plaintiff-stated a claim even though it
alleged only private injury.27
2. Kind of Injury
Section 4 requires that the injury be suffered "in [plaintiff's] business
or property."28 Courts have held that "business or property" includes
the activity of a not-for-profit corporation.29 But an employee's loss of
wages or termination is not a loss in his "business or property"3 unless
the employment itself is a commercial enterprise. Thus, sales supervi-
sors31 and commission salesmen 32 have been held to suffer a loss in
"business or property" when they allege antitrust violations caused
23. 214 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1954).
24. Id. at 893.
25. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Justice Black stated:
[Defendant's illegal combination] is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just
one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the
economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen,
one at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups.
Id. at 213 (footnote omitted).
26. 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam).
27. The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which had held that plaintiff
failed to state a claim because it "fail[ed] to establish that there has been any appreciable lessening
in the sale [of the burners] or that the public has been deprived of a product of overall superior-
ity." Id. at 659 (quoting Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 273 F.2d 196,
200 (7th Cir. 1960)).
28. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
29. See, eg., Friends of Animals, Inc. v. American Veterinary Med. Ass'n, 310 F. Supp. 1016
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (private treble damage action allowed even though plaintiff was a not-for-profit
animal protection agency).
30. Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727,730 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921
(1973).
31. Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
32. Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942). But see Quinonez v. National
Ase'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976).Washington University Open Scholarship
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their terminations. Subject to this exception, however, employees do
not suffer losses within the meaning of section 4.
At first, the requirement that the loss be "in" business or property
caused problems when the plaintiff claimed the violation prevented
him from entering the field. For example, in Dtff, v. Kansas City Star
Corp.,31 the Eighth Circuit held that a private plaintiff who claimed
defendant's monopolization prevented his entry into the newspaper
publishing business lacked standing to sue. He could not allege injury
"in" any business because he was not yet engaged in business. Al-
though the Eighth Circuit apparently still takes this position,34 courts
that have recently considered the matter have rejected it.35 This does
not mean that plaintiffs can allege any conceivable future injury. In-
stead, the issue becomes one of assessing the likelihood that plaintiff
would have entered the field: Was the plaintiff "ready and able" to
enter into competition? If the plaintiff can demonstrate adequate expe-
rience, financing, and contractual commitments, his claim will state an
injury "in" business or property.36
The "ready and able" test poses some procedural problems. First,
there is the question of certainty of application: How should courts bal-
ance these factors when assessing plaintiff's likelihood of entry? They
have not faced the very close situations where, for example, plaintiff
has neither experience nor contractual obligations, but does have con-
siderable financial backing. Second, even if the standard could be
readily applied, how will a court make its findings of fact about experi-
ence, commitments, and financial support? The "ready and able" in-
quiry speaks to plaintiff's standing and is made before the presentation
of any evidence. If a preliminary hearing is held on this question, who
will have the burden of proof? Courts embracing the "ready and able"
33. 299 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1962).
34. See, eg., Ideal Plumbing Co. v. Benco, Inc., 529 F.2d 973, 977-78 (8th Cir. 1976); Morn.
ing Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383, 387 (8th Cir.) (the fact of injury must be
shown "with a fair degree of certainty"), cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
35. See, eg., Quinonez v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976)
(professional security consultant's loss of future employment); Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
365 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1966) (investor's lost profits resulting from exclusion from gas refining
industry), cer. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1967).
36. In Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1966), cer. denied, 385 U.S.
991 (1967), plaintiff alleged defendants' conspiracies kept him from acquiring his own gas plant,
but the court found that plaintiff had no experience in the refining industry, had no financial
backing, and had made no investment in equipment. It therefore affmed the district court's
dismissaL
[Vol. 1978:529
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/3
ANTITRUST STANDING
test have not yet faced these issues.37
3. The Passing-On Doctrine
The most interesting injury in fact question is whether a middle-
man, who alleges that his seller's anticompetitive conduct has inflated
the price of goods that he later sold to his customers, suffers an injury
under section 4. From 1890 to 1960 the unanimous answer was "no. 38
A plaintiff in this situation did not suffer an injury; indeed to award
treble damages would be to award him four-fold-he would recover
three times from the defendant and once from his buyers. The
Supreme Court reached this conclusion in Keogh v. Chicago & North-
western Railway,3 9 where a manufacturer complained that he was in-
jured by a supplier's anticompetitive rate structure. Justice Brandeis,
writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed judgment for the defendant:
"[N]o court or jury could say that, if the rate had been lower, Keogh
would have enjoyed the difference between the rates. . . [Rather] the
benefit might have gone to his customers."'  Keogh was significant be-
cause it presumed that a reasonable middleman would pass on all price
increases. The Court found it unnecessary to inquire whether the mid-
dleman in fact passed-on the increase to his customers.
Before 1960 the lower federal courts uniformly applied this so-called
passing-on doctrine. In the Oil Jobbers Cases,4' for example, there
were allegations that defendants conspired to raise the jobber price of
gasoline throughout the midwest. Plaintiffs were jobbers who bought
gasoline from defendants and resold it to service stations at a price that
included a fixed profit margin. Because plaintiffs passed-on the whole-
sale increases to their buyers, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits held they
could not claim injury under section 4.42
The difficulty with the Keogh passing-on doctrine was that it pre-
37. See id. See also Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1967).
38. See Pollack, supra note 16, at 23.
39. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
40. Id. at 165.
41. Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 56 F. Supp. 569 (D. Minn.
1944), aft'd, 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D Wis.), appeal dimissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942).
42. The passing-on doctrine has also been recognized in Robinson-Patman price discrimina-
tion contexts. See Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 965 (1957).
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vented middlemen from showing they were in fact injured. Even if
they can pass on increases to their buyers, they may suffer a loss in
relative market share or be squeezed from the market.43 Sellers may
not usually intend to drive their distributors out of business, but it is
certainly a possibility, particularly when manufacturers are attempting
to vertically integrate.
In 1960 the Third Circuit, in Hanover Shoe, Inc. P. United Shoe
Mfachine Corp.,' questioned the validity of the Keogh presumption,
though it substituted an equally invalid presumption. Plaintiff alleged
that defendants had monopolized the manufacture of shoe-making
equipment. Plaintiff rented its machines from defendant, claiming in-
jury from monopolistic rental fees. Defendant relied on Keogh and
asserted plaintiff could show no injury in fact because it could pass-on
any losses to its customers. The district court disagreed. Without men-
tioning Keogh, it distinguished the Oil Jobber Cases on the ground that
the middlemen in those cases only resold and did not, as here, use the
product for their own manufacture.45
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment,46 but declined to em-
brace a consumer-middleman distinction.47 The Court determined it
would be impossible to allocate the portion of the plaintiff's price that
represented increased costs.48 In other words, while Keogh assumed
middlemen always passed-on, the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe as-
sumed defendants could never prove it except where it was clear they
had passed-on the entire amount of the increased costs, e.g., in costs-
plus situations.49 Justice White summarized the majority's rejection of
the passing-on defense:
We hold that the buyer is ... entitled to damages if he raises the price
for his own product. As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal
price, he takes from the buyer more than the law allows. At whatever
price the buyer sells, the price he pays the seller remains illegally high and
43. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 757 n.13 (1977); note 156 infra.
44. 185 F. Supp. 826 (M.D. Pa.), af'd per cur/am, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 901 (1960).
45. Id. at 831.
46. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
47. The logic of this distinction seems futile, but it has nevertheless remained a favorite in the
Third Circuit. For example, in Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830
(3d Cir. 1962), the plaintiffs were wholesalers and brokers who used defendant-auction company's
services. Though the plaintiffs "consumed" defendant's services, the Third Circuit nevertheless
characterized them as "middlemen" and permitted the passing-on defense.
48. 392 U.S. at 484.
49. Id.
[Vol. 1978:529
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his profits would be greater were his costs lowers.50
The Court distinguished Keogh in a rather conclusory manner by char-
acterizing its passing-on language as dictum." In any event, and de-
spite its curious origins, the courts of appeals have uniformly followed
Hanover Shoe in its basic rejection of the passing-on defense.5 2
Hanover Shoe has recently had adverse implications for the ultimate
consumer.53 The Third Circuit's underlying rationale was that the
passing-on doctrine posed insurmountable problems m proving
whether and to what extent middlemen passed on price increases. The
same problems face any ultimate consumer seeking section 4 redress
against a defendant high in the supply chain. Initially, this application
of Hanover Shoe did not cause much concern because remoteness usu-
ally barred the ultimate consumer anyway. 4 But as courts relaxed the
proximity requirement,55 otherwise hopeful consumers began to con-
sider whether Hanover Shoe would rear its head as a bar.
It did just that in 1970 in the Plumbing Fixtures Cases.6 Plaintiffs
represented a class of ultimate consumers who had purchased homes
containing plumbing fixtures manufactured by defendants. The price
of the homes included the price of the fixtures. Plaintiffs sued under
section 4, alleging that defendants had conspired to raise the price of
their plumbing fixtures.57 Citing Hanover Shoe for the proposition that
courts generally are incapable of tracing the price of goods through a
long chain of supply, the district court denied standing.58 The same
problems that permitted the Hanover Shoe plaintiffs to sue were now
used to deny consumer plaintiffs their day in court. The Plumbing Fix-
50. Id. at 489.
51. Id. at 491 n.8.
52. The most celebrated application of the Hanover Shoe doctrine occurred in the Electrical
Cases of the mid-1960's, which were decided after the district court opinion in Hanover Shoe but
before the Supreme Court affirmance. Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp.
914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Public Utils. Dist. No. I v. General Elec. Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash.
1964); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied, 337
F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 225 F. Supp. 332
(N.D. Ill. 1963), af'd, 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964).
53. See 392 U.S. at 484 (discussion of problems to be faced by ultimate consumers if passing-
on doctrine allowed).
54. See text accompanying notes 67-73 infra.
55. See text accompanying notes 74-76 infira.
56. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 381
(E.D. Pa. 1970); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D.
13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afdper curiam, 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (also cited as Mangano).
57. 323 F. Supp. at 382.
58. Id. at 385.
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tures Cases generated much criticism,5 9 and the courts of appeals soon
divided.6 0 The Supreme Court resolved the question in IllniLnoi rick,61
holding that indirect purchasers could not sue under section 4.
C. Proximity
It is not enough for a private plaintiff to assert that a defendant's
anticompetitive behavior has, in fact, caused him injury. Courts have
required a showing that the injury and the anticompetitive act be suffi-
ciently proximate. Unlike the other section 4 standing requirements,
there is no specific statutory language supporting the proximity require-
ment. This, coupled with the Supreme Court never having decided a
case involving the proximity requirement,62 has made for an active but
contradictory case law development. 3
Courts have taken three basic approaches to proximity. Initially,
they used traditional notions of privity to require that section 4 plain-
tiffs be in direct contractual contact with defendants. Later, some
courts recognized the needs of indirect purchasers and competitors and
took a broader "target area" approach. 64 Finally, in 1975 the Sixth
Circuit went a step beyond the broadest limits of "target area" and
adopted a "zone of interests" test,65 which, as we shall see, all but elimi-
59. See, e.g., Comment, Mangano and Ultimate Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hano.
ver Shoe Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. R.v. 394 (1972); Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases:
The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 976 (1975).
60. Compare the Plumbing Fixtures Cases, supra note 56, with In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974), and West Virginia v. Charles
Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). This conflict among the
circuits was hardly widespread. Only the Ninth Circuit, the Plumbing Fixtures Cases court, per-
mitted the unqualified offensive application of the passing-on doctrine. Even those courts that
accepted the basic thesis of the Plumbing Fixtures Cases held that plaintiffs who buy from middle-
men, who in turn buy directly from the antitrust violator, are not barred by Hanover Shoe because
the problem of showing a one-step pass-on is considerably less than the problem of demonstrating
that an uncompetitive price has filtered down through many levels of supply. See City of Denver
v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971). This notion of tying the offensive use of
Hanover Shoe to considerations of proximity is important to an understanding of Illinols Brick.
See text accompanying notes 144-53 infra.
61. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See text accompanying notes 134-43
infra.
62. But see note 90 infra.
63. The Illinois Brick Court took advantage of the open-ended nature of this proximity in-
quiry. See notes 144-53 infra.
64. See, ag., Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434U.S. 923 (1977); John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th
Cir. 1977).
65. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/3
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nates the proximity requirement.66
1. Directness
In Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,67 plaintiff, a shareholder in a photo-
chemical corporation, which competed with defendant, alleged that de-
fendant's unlawful conspiracies drove the corporation out of business,
causing him great financial loss.68 The court held that the plaintiff was
"too remote" to sue for treble damages; only those in strict privity with
antitrust defendants had a civil remedy.69 This limitation had wide-
spread effects: no longer could shareholders, patent licensees, or credi-
tors assert that defendants' anticompetitive conduct injured their
corporation, licensor, or debtor.70
This strict proximity requirement has often frustrated the purposes of
the antitrust laws. For example, in Al Barnett & Sons, Inc. v. Outboard
Marine Corp. ,71 representatives of a class of distributors of general
marine products brought suit against manufacturers of general marine
products and outboard motors, alleging defendants had illegally tied
the sale of motors to the sale of marine equipment. The court sug-
gested in dictum that it would mechanically apply the directness test
and concluded that because the parties were not in a direct contractual
relationship plaintiffs probably lacked standing.72 But it is clear that
the Sherman Act was meant to provide a remedy for the plaintiff in
Barnett. Tying arrangements not only injure the tied buyer, but also
hurt competitors in the tied product.73 To require any more "direct-
66. See text accompanying notes 77-90.
67. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
68. Id. at 706.
69. Id. at 709.
70. The directness approach does not even permit shareholders to press their antitrust claims
in the form of derivative suits unless they can show that the directors were "personally involved in
the wrongdoing." Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
71. 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974).
72. The district court held that plaintiffs' motion for certification of the class action should be
dismissed because of Rule 23 infirmities. But one of the issues under Rule 23 is whether the
representative can adequately and fairly protect the interests of the class, and the court expressed
concern that the representatives lacked standing:
There is substantial doubt at this stage of the case whether the plaintiffs can further
satisfy Rule 23(a) which requires them fairly and adequately to protect the interests of
the class because under the law of this Circuit it now appears uncertain whether the
representative plaintiffs have standing to sue ....
Id. at 51.
73. Indeed, the primary reason for prohibiting tie-ins is to prevent a monopolist in one prod-
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ness" in these situations would all but eliminate private enforcement.
Before Hanover Shoe, a strict requirement of privity would have
eliminated private enforcement in virtually every other antitrust area as
well. Whenever there were multilevel economies, violators were insu-
lated from middlemen by the passing-on doctrine and from ultimate
consumers by Loeb's directness requirement.
2. Target Area
A few circuits, notably the Second and Ninth, responded to the pre-
Hanover Shoe situation by relaxing the strict privity requirement. The
Ninth Circuit coined the term "target area" for this purpose in Karseal
Corp. v. Richfleld Oil Corp.74 In Karseal, plaintiff, who manufactured
car polish and sold it to service stations, sued a producer who spon-
sored but did not manufacture the polish. Plaintiff alleged that defend-
ant contracted with service stations to provide its petroleum products in
exchange for the stations' promise to deal exclusively in the sponsored
polish.
Under the Loeb "directness" approach only the service stations that
entered into the contracts could sue. But the Ninth Circuit gave greater
deference to the remedial purposes of the antitrust laws. It adopted a
target approach which asks whether plaintiff is: (1) within the area of
the economy endangered by the breach of competitive conditions, and
(2) within the target area of the defendant's illegal practice.75 Appar-
ently, the first question concerns the general target area contemplated
by the legislation; the second concerns the sub-area generated by the
defendant's specific conduct. After setting up this form of analysis, the
Karseal court found that the plaintiffs, as foreclosed competitors, had
standing.
The target area test raises several questions. For example, how does
the general inquiry under (1) differ from the specific inquiry under (2)?
Does the second inquiry require an assessment of foreseeability? Must
the defendant have foreseen that his anticompetitive behavior would
injure the plaintiff? The Ninth Circuit apparently says "yes," but the
Second Circuit has rejected any notion of foreseeability in defining the
uct from extending his power to another product. See generally Bowman, TyIng4rrangements and
the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
74. 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955). See Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809 (9th
Cir. 1968).
75. 221 F.2d at 365.
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target area. 6 If foreseeability is irrelevant, it is difficult to see what the
second question adds to the first. In that case, the target area is not a
limitation at all because virtually all anticompetitive behavior gener-
ates ripples of injury. On the other hand, a strict foreseeability require-
ment would significantly reduce the effectiveness of private
enforcement.
3. Zone of Interests
Until 1975 all of the circuits relied on either the Loeb directness
test"7 or the broader target area test.78  In Malamud v. Sinclair Oil
Corp. ,79 however, the Sixth Circuit purported to adopt a third ap-
proach, rejecting the traditional tests as "demand[ing] too much from
plaintiffs at the pleading stage of the case."8 The facts in Malamud are
peculiar; the case sounds more like a contract action than an antitrust
action. Plaintiffs were the sole shareholders of a petroleum distributing
company (Malco) and of three real estate companies also named as
plaintiffs. In 1965 Malco executed a contract with defendant which
provided that Malco would buy its supplies from Sinclair for three
years and Sinclair would financially assist the real estate firms in ac-
quiring new service stations. Malco began purchasing its supplies from
Sinclair, but Sinclair soon refused to finance some proposed real estate
purchases. So in 1966 Malco signed a supply agreement with Texaco,
but because Sinclair refused to terminate its agreement, Malco contin-
ued to deal with them until the contract expired. Upon its termination,
Malco sued Sinclair, claiming Sinclair's initial refusal to finance the
real estate purchases and its ultimate refusal to terminate the contract
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs claimed their injury
76. Compare Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 923 (1971), with Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
77. See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1973); Kauffman v.
Dreyfus Fund, 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Volasco Prods. Co. v.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Miley v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), a f'dper curiam, 242 F.2d 758 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957).
78. See, ag., Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), ceri. denied,
402 U.S. 923 (1971); Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); Sanitary
Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966); South Carolina Coun-
cil of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934
(1966); Sandidge v. Rogers, 256 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1958).
79. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 1149.
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was lost profits from the unacquired service stations!"
The district court relied on the Sixth Circuit's prior adoption of the
Loeb directness test 2 and denied standing to all plaintiffs except the
real estate companies. The court-addressing only the standing of the
real estate companies-rejected the "direct" and "target" tests as going
too far beyond the Article III case or controversy minimum.8 3 Instead,
it applied the "zone of interests" test that the Supreme Court had enun-
ciated in an administrative law context in Association of Data Process-
ing Service Organizations v. Camp: 4 "[Wihether the interest sought to
be protected by the claimant is arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected by the statute . .. 8.5I' The court found the real estate
companies were seeking to protect their interest in "the expansion of
their business"8 6 and concluded that this was arguably within the zone
of interests protected by the Sherman Act. It therefore affirmed the real
estate companies' standing.
Malamud raises a number of difficult doctrinal and practical
problems. First, the zone of interests approach is even less of a test
than the target area approach. The Sherman and Clayton Acts take
such wide-angle aims at the problems of antitrust that it would seem to
be impossible to tie any meaningful standing requirement to general
notions of statutory purpose. Indeed, the Malamud court itself balked
81. Id. at 1143-45.
82. Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
83. 521 F.2d at 1149-50. The court noted:
[Tihe principal function of the [standing] doctrine is as a device to eliminate those plain-
tiffs who are jurisdictionally barred by Article III from maintaining a suit.... The
courts have used [the two traditional] standing doctrines in order to arrest some antitrust
litigation at an early stage. As we see it, however, by using either approach, a court is
enabled to make a determination on the merits of a claim under the guise of assessing the
standing of the claimant.
Id. (emphasis in original)
84. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Plaintiffs in Data Processing were computer service organizations
who sought to challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency which permitted national
banks to make their data processing services available to customers. The district court dismissed
the action for lack of standing, 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968), and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the interests plaintiffs
sought to protect were "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated" by the
relevant statute. 397 U.S. at 153. In adopting this test, the Court rejected the so-called "legal
interest" test of Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1938), on the ground that the "legal
interest" test was actually an inquiry into the merits. 397 U.S. at 153.
85. 521 F.2d at 1151 (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153).
86. Id.
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at requiring anything more than the constitutional minimum.s
Second, it is difficult to justify the application of Data Processing to
antitrust plaintiffs. One of the reasons for using a broad test of stand-
ing in administrative law is that increasing the number of private
watchdogs may enhance the integrity of federal regulatory programs.88
Section 4, however, reverses the roles; plaintiffs stand in the shoes of
the government in attempting to control private activity.
Finally, the application of the zone of interests test to administrative
agencies is distinguishable because it is used only when the agency is
capable of giving the relief sought.8 9 A similar limitation would not
affect standing under section 4 because courts are always capable of
granting the monetary relief sought by antitrust plaintiffs. Despite
these practical and theoretical problems, Malamud represents a signifi-
cant movement away from restrictive interpretations of proximity, a
movement Congress has attempted to duplicate.9°
II. THE INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: FLUID CLASS ACTIONS
AND PARENS PATRIAE
The development of judicially imposed restraints on the reach of sec-
87. The court explained that the injury in fact requirement meets the Article III minimum
and complained that further nonconstitutional limitations based on concepts of judicial restraint
have caused a great deal of confusion. Id. at 1149.
88. See generally Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative .4ctior 4n Inadequate Surro-
gate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE LJ. 425 (1974).
89. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), noted in 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 95 (1976).
90. The Supreme Court recently gave a strong indication that it will adopt a target area
approach to the problem of proximity. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477 (1977), it vacated a judgment based on plaintiffs claim that defendant had violated the an-
timerger provisions of the Clayton Act. Defendant, the nation's largest manufacturer and opera-
tor of bowling alleys, acquired a number of bowling centers which competed with plaintiffs'
bowling establishments. Plaintiff brought a private treble damage action under § 4, claiming that
defendant's acquisition might substantially lessen competition in violation of § 7 of the Clayton
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). The Court held that in a treble damages action under § 4, plaintiff
must prove actual injury despite the fact that § 7 is aimed at curbing hypothetical future restraints
as well as established ones. In describing those injuries actionable under § 4, the Court said:
For plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations, they must prove
more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must
prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended
to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.
429 U.S. at 489 (emphasis in original). This resembles the Ninth Circuit's target area test. See
text accompanying notes 74-76 supra. However, it is far from clear what this apparent adoption of
the target area test means after Illinois Brick. See text accompanying notes 144-53 infra.
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tion 4 can be viewed as a series of responses to the realization that
ultimate consumers bear the real antitrust losses in a complex economy.
Those courts that raised standing barriers were certainly concerned that
the claims of numerous consumers would overwhelm the federal judici-
ary. Thus on the injury in fact question these courts used what had
originally been the consumers' shield-the passing-on doctrine-as a
sword to combat the feared march of consumers. 91 On the other hand,
those courts that had been more sympathetic and less fearful of the
consuming public extended standing by relaxing the proximity
requirement.92
These two standing issues-injury in fact and proximity-pose dif-
ferent problems for the consumer. As Malamud demonstrated, require-
ments of proximity need not be taken too seriously by a court that
wants to reach the merits. The injury in fact requirement, however, can
be a real barrier. Decisions based on this requirement are moored to
Article III of the Constitution, and neither judicial embellishment nor
congressional intervention can appreciably slacken the line.
Thus one should view congressional attempts to make inroads on the
traditional standing requirements with two questions in mind: Is the
proposed change constitutional? And is it effective in relaxing standing
barriers? Changes in the injury in fact requirement will almost always
be unconstitutional, but at least before Illinois Brick the outlook for
legislative reform of the proximity requirement was bright, and Con-
gress accepted the challenge.
A. Fluid Class A4ctionk
When Congress amended Rule 2313 in 1966 to provide that members
of a class need not be specifically identified, fluid class actions appeared
to be the hope of the consumer antitrust plaintiff. A rash of section 4
actions soon were filed on behalf of very large fluid classes: 1.5 million
bread buyers in Philadelphia,94 20-40 million buyers of General Motors
cars nationwide, 95 and even all persons in the United States who
breathe air.6
91. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
92. See text accompanying notes 74-90 supra.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
94. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 73,879 (E.D. Pa. 1970), appeal
dinissed, 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
95. Boches v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
96. In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970), a i,'din
part and rev'd inpart, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
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For several reasons, Rule 23 was not the consumer panacea that
many had hoped it would be; none of the fluid class antitrust actions
filed in the early 1970's ever reached the merits.97 The principal reason
was that Rule 23 does not alleviate any standing problems; the class
representative and the underlying class members must still jump the
injury in fact and proximity hurdles.9 8 Of course, the major advantage
of the fluid class action was that it bypassed some of the major practical
litigation problems, e.g, an individual plaintiff suffering a fifty-cent
overcharge has little incentive to take his case to a federal court, but the
representative of millions of plaintiffs alleging a multimillion dollar in-
jury would not hesitate to sue.
Even the practical purposes of the Rule 23 amendments have been
frustrated. The prospect of handling a class containing millions of
members has forced some courts to refuse certification on the ground of
uunmanageability. 9 Finally, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin°--which in-
terpreted Rule 23 to require individual notice to all identifiable class
members-all but halted the use of the fluid consumer class action.
B. Parens Patriae
Frustrated consumer antitrust plaintiffs, attempting to avoid the
shortcomings of the fluid class action, began to examine the idea that a
state, as parens patriae, could sue under section 4 and recover treble
damages on behalf of its injured citizens. In this way, the state could
offensively use the pass-on doctrine, which the lower federal courts and
later the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick prohibited of individual
plaintiffs.
Of course, a state may itself suffer an antitrust injury and, if it meets
the traditional standing requirements, can sue under section 4 like any
other plaintiff. So, for example, Iowa could allege that asphalt distribu-
tors, with whom it contracted for state highway projects, illegally com-
bined to fix prices." 1
The more difficult question is whether a state, as parens patriae, can
97. See Handler & Blechmann, Antitruist and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens
Patriae and a Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 628 & n.14 (1976) (quoting Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)).
98. See In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973).
99. See, ag., Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 70 F.R.D. 656 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Plekowski v.
Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.RD. 443 (M.D. Ga. 1975), appeal dismissed, 557 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir.
1977).
100. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
101. Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968), afd, 409
F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969).
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sue on behalf of its injured citizens. The original English concept of
parens patriae was limited to the royal prerogative of kings to take cus-
tody and act on behalf of orphans, mental incompetents, and chari-
ties. 10 2 This notion expanded in the United States where the royal
prerogative passed to the states, which could sue on behalf of their in-
jured citizens."03 Although it is clear such actions are generally cogni-
zable in the federal courts, the more particular question in antitrust is
whether they are permitted by section 4. °4
Commentators tend to distinguish antitrust parens patriae suits alleg-
ing injury to a state's citizens from those alleging injury to a state's
general economy.10 5 But these two species of parens patriae actions
seem indistinguishable: injury to a state's general economy is the aggre-
gate of injuries suffered by its individual citizens. At best, the differ-
ence is one of degree: when enough individuals are injured, the general
economy of the state suffers."°
The first Supreme Court case to consider the question of parens pa-
triae recovery under the antitrust laws was Georgia v. Pennsylvania Rail-
way Co. , 7 in which Georgia alleged that the railroads had conspired
to restrict trade in the South by favoring the Northern states. Georgia
sought treble damages and injunctive relief on the ground that the con-
spiracy severely damaged its economy. The only issue the Court faced,
however, was Georgia's claim for equitable relief; it held that Georgia
could properly state a claim for an injunction as parens patriae for its
injured citizens.
The Supreme Court did not answer the question left open by
102. For an excellent treatment of the common law history of parens patriae, see Curtis, The
Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 895
(1976). See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1972); Malina & Blechmann,
Parens Patriae Suitsfor Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 193 (1970).
103. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
104. The question in this case is not whether Hawaii may maintain its lawsuit on behalf
of its citizens, but rather whether the injury for which it seeks to recover is compensable
under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Hence, Hawaii's claim cannot be resolved simply by refer-
ence to any general principles governingparenspatrlae actions.
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 259 (1972).
105. See Handler & Blechmann, supra note 97; Malina & Blechmann, supra note 102.
106. The Supreme Court seemed to lay this distinction to rest in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972): "A large and ultimately indeterminable part of the injury to the 'general
economy' as it is measured by economists, is no more than a reflection of injuries to the 'business
or property' of consumers. .
107. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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Georgia-whether a state can recover damages for antitrust injuries to
its citizens-until 1972. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,1"8 Hawaii
brought an action against four oil companies, alleging that they com-
bined to restrain trade in the sale, marketing, and distribution of petro-
leum products in Hawaii and monopolized and attempted to
monopolize that trade. Hawaii's complaint contained three counts:
First, it sued in its own proprietary capacity for overcharges on petro-
leum sold to the state itself; second, it sued in its capacity as parens
patriae for general injury to the state's economy; 10 9 and finally, it sued
as a representative of the class of all overcharged petroleum buyers in
the state. Hawaii sought injunctive and monetary relief under each
count.
The oil companies moved to dismiss the parens patriae and class ac-
tion counts. Typically, the district court dismissed the class action as
unmanageable. 10  The court, however, had more trouble with the
parens patriae count and decided to certify the matter to the Ninth Cir-
cuit."' The Ninth Circuit dismissed the parens patriae count," 2 and
Hawaii appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court recognized that Georgia was inapplicable because it in-
volved only injunctive relief. Unlike section 4, section 16 of the Clay-
ton Act (which provides for injunctive relief) does not require that the
injuries suffered be "in business or property.""' 3 The Court found this
difference significant. Until Congress makes it clear that injury to a
state's general economy is an injury to its "business or property," the
Court would not permit parens patriae suits on that basis. It was reluc-
tant to give section 4 the full reach that Georgia gave section 16 because
of "the problem of double recovery inherent in allowing damages for
harm both to the economic interests of individuals and for the quasi-
sovereign interests of the State."' 14
108. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
109. Hawaii's original parens patriae claim made no specific mention of the state's economy,
but rather emphasized the injury to its citizens. Id. at 254. The amendment of Hawaii's com-
plaint to specifically allege an injury to its general economy illustrates the force of the injury-to-
citizens/injury-to-general economy distinction.
110. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd, 431 F.2d 1282
(9th Cir. 1970), at'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); text accompanying note 99 supra.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
112. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282 (1970).
113. See notes 28-37 supra and accompanying text.
114. 405 U.S. at 264. In his dissent, Justice Douglas indicates that when individual injury is
not capable of being separated from injury to the general economy, individual recovery can sim-
ply be barred by the parens patriae recovery of the state. Id. at 266 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1978:529
The Hawaii Court invited Congress to extend the "business or prop-
erty" requirement of section 4 to injuries to a state's general econ-
omy.115 Congress seemed to accept the invitation in 1976 by passing
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Procedures Improvements Act."t 6 Ti-
tle III of the Act, entitled "Parens Patriae," added six sections to section
4. Section 4(c) permits
[a]ny attorney general of a State [to] bring a civil action in the name of
such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such
State. . . to secure monetary relief as provided in this section for injuries
sustained by such natural persons to their property by reason of any vio-
lation of the Sherman Act. 17
The Act addresses the fears of double recovery, which the Hawaii
Court expressed, by excluding from the parens patriae recovery any
amount that "duplicates amounts which have been awarded for the
same injury .. ."118 To deal with possible due process problems in
precluding duplicative individual recovery, the Act includes a notifica-
tion procedure which allows individual citizens to "opt out" of the
solution to the majority's double recovery concerns, however, poses serious due process problems.
See text accompanying notes 121-24 infra.
115. The Ninth Circuit extended a similar invitation in California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d
774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), though the basis for the rejection of parens patriac
in Frito-Lay was quite different than in Hawaii. The Ninth Circuit viewed California's common
law parens patriae recovery as an unwarranted attempt to undermine the class action rules:
The state is looking beyond recovery for injuries to its citizens to its own ultimate
acquisition of the recoveries obtained. That acquisition, it asserts, will serve a valid pub-
lic service by providing the injured citizens with the closest equivalent of the recovery
which, individually, is beyond their reach.
This may be a worthy state aim, but in our judgment it is not the type of state action
taken to afford the sort of benefit that the common-law concept ofparenspatriae contem-
plates. The means for conferring such a benefit, based as they are on management and
acquisition of the property of others, free from the safeguards which legislation and rule
have thrown up around both guardianships and class actions, constitutes state action of a
sort that does not fit the common-law concept
Id. at 776 (footnotes omitted). The court's concern, of course, was that uncontrolled parens patriae
recovery would vitiate Rule 23's carefully tailored guarantees of due process. These due process
issues became the primary focus of the new legislation, and perhaps this explains why the House
Report on the Act mentions Frito-Lay but not Hawaii. See H.R. RaP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1975). As to whether the Act successfully ameliorates these due process concerns, see text
accompanying notes 120-24 infra.
116. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4C-4H, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15n
(1976)).
117. Id. § 4C(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1394 (1976). One commentator has suggested that the Act's use of
the doctrine of parens patriae may be historically inaccurate. See Curtis, supra note 102, arguing
that recovery of damages under the Act ignores the fact that the device of parens patriae grew out
of the development of the doctrine of the quasi-sovereign, a doctrine historically limited to injunc-
tive relief.
118. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4C(a)(1)(a), 90 Stat. 1394 (1976).
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parens patriae action and thereby preserve their individual claims.119
Despite widespread optimism that the Act would be the consumer
antitrust cure-all,1 20 some serious difficulties threaten to dampen its ef-
fect. First, the Act's notification procedures pose serious due process
problems. To make the parens patriae alternative a viable one, Con-
gress made it clear that notice by publication is presumptively valid.' 21
But it is difficult to see how this constructive notice satisfies due process
when Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin2 2 struck down an almost identical
procedure under Rule 23. At least one commentator has suggested that
Congress overcame the Eisen problem by enacting section 4C(b)(1),
which directs courts to require further notice if due process so dic-
tates.1 23 This, however, only passes the due process buck, and while the
Act may thus be constitutional on its face, it could never be constitu-
tionally applied in an effective, widespread manner if individual notice
is the rule and not the exception. 124
The Act has generated nonconstitutional criticisms as well. The con-
centration of so much enforcement power in the hands of fifty state
attorneys general poses a serious risk of abuse by politically appetitive
state officials."z Although the Act incorporates several safeguards,
their effectiveness is doubtful. A court may award attorney's fees to
119. Id. § 4C(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1394 (1976).
120. See, e.g., Comment, Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions for Treble Damages, 14 HARv. J.
LEGIS. 328 (1977); Note, The Proposed Antitrust Parens Patriae Act: O'erdue Antitrust Relief/or
Ultimate Consumers, 45 U. CINN. L. REv. 219 (1976); Note, Parens Fatriae: An Effective Consumer
Remedy in Antitrust, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 135 (1976).
121. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4C(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1394 (1976).
122. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See Handler & Blechmann, supra note 97, at 668. See also Note,
Parens Patriae in Antitrust: A Blessingfor the Consumer or an Affront to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment?, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1127 (1974).
123. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4C(bX), 90 Stat. 1394 (1976).
124. It has been argued that because Eiren was based on a construction of Rule 23, it could
not be applied to invalidate the Act's notice by publication. See Comment, supra note 120, at 341-
42. However, nothing in Eisen indicates that the general matrix within which the case was de-
cided could be so easily avoided by adopting identical procedures with a different name.
There have also been suggestions that the Act violates the appointments clause of the Constitu-
tion, U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl 2, by giving state officials the power to enforce the federal anti-
trust laws. See Handler & Blechmann, supra note 97, at 668. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
has added force to this argument. In Buckley, the Court held the Federal Election Campaign Act
violated the appointments clause by giving a congressionally appointed commission enforcement
powers.
125. Commentators have also criticized the Act on the ground that it reduces the primary
benefit of having a private remedy-200 million private citizens to enforce the antitrust laws-to
50 state attorneys general. Handler & Blechmann, supra note 97, at 670-71. Whether this numeri-
cal reduction in the antitrust police force is offset by the new officers' expertise and dedication
remains to be seen.
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prevailing defendants,126 and in such cases a state may revoke the ap-
plicability of the Act if it feels its attorney general is proceeding in bad
faith.27 Both of these deterrents to political abuse depend on the al-
most impossible showing of bad faith, and the revocation procedure
may only serve to inject more state politics into the enforcement
scheme. The Act also prohibits state attorneys general from hiring
outside counsel on a contingent fee basis.'28 Although this provision
may have the advantage of encouraging the development of specialized
state antitrust divisions, it has little to do with discouraging political
abuses within those divisions.
While commentators discussed these due process and political abuse
issues, 12 9 a more fundamental question arose over the Act's basic effec-
tiveness. The parens patriae suit, like the fluid class action, may do
nothing to cure any underlying standing infirmities. Its value, like the
class action, may be limited to pretrial practicalities because it appears
settled that a state can sue as parens patriae on behalf of its injured
citizens only when those individuals would otherwise have standing to
sue on their own behalf. 3 This raises two questions: Does the Act
eliminate standing requirements for the underlying consumers? And if
so, does Congress have the power to eliminate them?
The Hawaii Court characterized the difficulty of parens patriae suits
for injury to a state's general economy as a failure to state an injury "to
its 'business or property.' "I By authorizing such suits, the Act implic-
itly solves any "business or property" problems. And because this re-
126. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4C(d)(2), 90 Stat. 1394 (1976).
127. Id. § 4H, 90 Stat. 1396 (1976).
128. Id. § 4B(I)(A), 90 Stat. 1396 (1976). Other contingent fee arrangements are subject to
court approval. Id. § 4B(l)(B), 90 Stat. 1396 (1976). Perhaps these concerns over political abuse
have been exaggerated. After all, the states are presumed capable of handling their own antitrust
laws. See Comment, supra note 120, at 348 n.80. But see Note, Colorado Antitrust Law: Untied
and Drifting, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 215 (1977). On the other hand, when we surrender the bulk of
federal enforcement to the states, are we not justified in requiring stronger guarantees of political
neutrality? This raises the converse of the "overzealous attorney general" issue. One of the rea-
sons we have a federal judiciary is the belief that a federal system will be less subject to the ebb
and flow of local politics. That, after all, is the traditional justification for federal diversity juris-
diction. See Frank, HistoHcal Basi of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRO1. 3,
22-28 (1948). This is particularly compelling in antitrust law, where local lines between economics
and politics are often so hazy. If we areto have the two systems, and then surrender virtually all
federal enforcement to the states, at least we can ask for additional statutory safeguards against
the winds of local politics.
129. See Handler & Blechmann, supra note 97.
130. Id. at 651-52.
131. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972).
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quirement is a nonconstitutional one based on considerations of
judicial restraint, Congress has the power to broaden its meaning.
Similarly, because the requirement of proximity has been a great
barrier to consumer recovery under section 4, one could interpret the
Act to eliminate this requirement for consumers represented by a state
as parens patriae. Again, Congress has the power to eliminate the non-
constitutional requirement of proximity. Any objections based on the
separation of powers question-whether Congress can force the courts
to ignore their own prudential doctrines-were probably laid to rest by
the Hawaii Court's invitation to Congress to do just that.' 32 But what
about the Hanover Shoe problem? 33 Whether Congress can constitu-
tionally avoid the Plumbing Fixtures result depends on whether the of-
fensive pass-on doctrine is based on notions of injury in fact or on
considerations of proximity.134 The Supreme Court soon had the op-
portunity to answer this question.
InI. THE JUDICIAL RETORT: ILLINOIS BRICK
In 1974 the State of Illinois and approximately seven hundred local
governments sued various Chicago-area concrete block manufacturers
alleging they had conspired to fix prices in violation of section 1. The
manufacturers sold the blocks to masonry contractors who used them
to build various concrete structures. The masonry contractors in turn
sold the structures to general contractors who incorporated them into
buildings sold to the plaintiffs.
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on the ground that the pass-on doctrine barred plaintiffs, as twice-re-
moved remote consumers, from recovery. 35 The Seventh Circuit re-
versed,'36 holding that the plaintiffs could recover treble damages if
they could prove the illegal overcharges were passed on to them. The
Court granted certiorari, 37 and the issue of whether Hanover Shoe
could be applied offensively-an issue dividing the courts of appeals
132. Id. at 262.
133. See text accompanying notes 44-61 supra.
134. If consumers are barred because they cannot show injury in fact, they cannot seek redress
in federal court because they do not present a "case or controversy," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and
because Congress cannot constitutionally provide relief that descends below this limit.
135. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461 (1976). The district court made it clear that
the basis of its holding was that plaintiffs were unable, as a matter of law, to show injury in fact.
Id. at 468.
136. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976).
137. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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for seven years' 3 -- finally became the object of the Supreme Court's
attention.
Justice White adopted the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in
the Plumbing Fixtures Cases,'39 holding that the plaintiffs could not use
the passing-on doctrine offensively. He weaved this holding on the
loom of an uncomplicated syllogism: (1) If Hanover Shoe prevents an
antitrust defendant from using passing-on as a shield, it should also
prevent an antitrust plaintiff from using it as a sword;14 0 (2) Hanover
Shoe will not be overruled; and (3) therefore passing-on cannot be used
offensively.
In support of the conclusion that passing-on must apply equally to
defendants and plaintiffs, Justice White first pointed to the risks of mul-
tiple liability that an asymmetric application would create:
Even though an indirect purchaser had already recovered for all or part
of an overcharge passed on to it, the direct purchaser would still recover
automatically the full amount of the overcharge that the indirect pur-
chaser had shown to be passed on; similarly, following an automatic re-
covery of the full overcharge by the direct purchaser, the indirect
purchaser could sue to recover the same amount.14
In addition, he relied on the argument that the same proof problems
that formed the basis of the Hanover Shoe rule are present in an offen-
sive context.142
138. See text accompanying notes 54-55 & 60 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
140. Plaintiffs conceded this first proposition:
The parties in this case agree that however § 4 is construed with respect to the pass-on
issue, the rule should apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants-that an indirect pur-
chaser should not be allowed to use a pass-on theory to recover damages from a defend-
ant unless the defendant would be allowed to use the pass-on defense in a suit by a direct
purchaser.
431 U.S. at 729. By relying exclusively on the symmetry theory, plaintiffs surrendered what was
probably their strongest argument; Le., they should be allowed to recover regardless of the defen-
sive pass-on bar. See text accompanying notes 148-50 infra. Nevertheless, because the amici and
Justice Brennan in his dissent took the asymmetric position, and because the majority thus felt the
need to respond, what seems to be a serious tactical error probably did not affect the Court's
treatment of the issues. One wonders, nevertheless, why plaintiffs chose to cast their lot with the
overruling of Hanover Shoe, particularly with the weight of stare decisis against them. See note
52 supra.
141. 431 U.S. at 730.
142. This perception that the attempt to trace the complex economic adjustments to a
change in the cost of a particular factor of production would greatly complicate and
reduce the effectiveness of already protracted treble-damages proceedings applies with
no less force to the assertion of pass-on theories by plaintiffs than it does to the assertion
by defendants.
Id. at 732.
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Justice White vigorously reaffirmed the assumptions underlying Han-
over Shoe, 143 and because none of the four dissenting justices seriously
questioned these assumptions in a defensive context, they will not be
reexamined here. It is more fruitful to examine the notion that Hanover
Shoe must be applied consistently to plaintiffs and defendants, a notion
which is indicative of the current direction of the Court's antitrust
policy.
A. Doctrinal Schizophrenia
One might have expected Illinois Brick to answer the question
whether passing-on is a doctrine of injury in fact or proximity. 144 In-
stead the majority opinion demonstrates an extraordinary ambivalence
towards this critical issue. On the one hand, everything in the text of
the opinion speaks the language of injury in fact. Hanover Shoe was an
injury in fact case, and the primary rationale in Illinois Brick is that the
same considerations precluding defensive passing-on preclude offensive
passing-on:
In this case we once again confront the question whether the overcharged
direct purchaser should be deemed for purposes of § 4 to have suffered
the full injury from the overcharge; but the issue is presented in the con-
text of a suit in which the plaintiff, an indirect purchaser, seeks to show its
injury by establishing pass-on by the direct purchaser and in which the
antitrust defendants rely on Hanover Shoe's rejection of the pass-on
theory. 1
45
On the other hand, the phrase "offensive passing-on" actually em-
bodies all of the considerations formerly associated with the proximity
inquiry. 46 There is no question but that the State of Illinois suffered
injury; the only question is by whose hand. This is the converse of the
Hanover Shoe situation. In defensive passing-on, there is no question
but that the defendant violated the antitrust laws; the only question is
whether he injured the complaining plaintiff. Justice White made a
weak reference to this distinction in a footnote:
Because we find Hanover Shoe dispositive here, we do not address the
143. "In considering whether to cut back or abandon the Hanover Shoe rule, we must bear in
mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where
Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation." Id. at 736. Neither dis-
senting opinion was based on the proposition that Hanover Shoe should be overruled. Id. at 747
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144. See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
145. 431 U.S. at 726.
146. See text accompanying notes 62-90 supra.
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standing issue, except to note, as did the Court of Appeals below,...
that the question of which persons have been injured by an illegal over-
charge for purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct from the question of
which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them standing to
sue for damages under § 4.147
This footnote puts the theoretical underpinnings of the case in even
more doubt: How can the Court say that Hanover Shoe is dispositive
and that it is not addressing the standing issue? Essentially, the major-
ity forces the round peg of defensive passing-on and injury in fact into
the square hole of offensive passing-on and proximity.
As discussed above, the injury in fact requirement is a rather low
hurdle, which is constitutionally limited to a narrow range, while the
proximity requirement is quite variable, being based primarily on con-
siderations of judicial economy. 148  Hanover Shoe represents the
Supreme Court's judgment that even the inflexibility of the injury in
fact requirement must give way to efforts aimed at maximizing the pri-
vate enforcement of the Sherman Act. If these enforcement considera-
tions were strong enough to overcome the strict requirement of injury
in fact, they should be strong enough to overcome objections based on
proximity.149 By applying Hanover Shoe in a mechanically symmetric
manner, the Illinois Brick majority turns this enforcement policy on its
head and reaches a result that, instead of maximizing private enforce-
ment, might well destroy it.'50
Perhaps even more importantly, the Court's failure to distinguish the
two standing issues allows it to ignore the entire line of lower federal
cases dealing with proximity. 5 ' Without mentioning a single case, the
147. 431 U.S. at 728 n.7.
148. See text accompanying notes 90-92 sufpra.
149. This argument was the central theme in Justice Brennan's dissent:
This frustration of the congressional scheme is in no way mandated by Hanover
Shoe.. .. To the contrary, the same considerations that Hanover Shoe held required
rejection of the defendant's argument there, that because plaintiff had passed on cost
increases to consumers in the form of higher prices defendant should be relieved of lia-
bility--especially the consideration that it is essential to the public interest to preserve
the effectiveness of the private treble damage action-requires affirmance of the decision
below construing § 4 to authorize respondents' suit.
431 U.S. at 749-50 (citation omitted).
150. For a discussion of the adverse effects on the private enforcement mechanism that I///-
no/s 'rick may generate, see text accompanying notes 154-62 infra.
151. See text accompanying notes 62-90 infra. Justice Brennan refers to some of these cases.
431 U.S. at 760. Unfortunately, he too demonstrates ambivalence toward the proposition that the
issue before him is one of proximity. His reference to the proximity cases is by way of analogy:
"But if the broad language of § 4 means anything, surely it must render the defendant liable to
those within the defendant's chain of distribution. It would indeed be 'paradoxical to deny recov-
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Court succeeds in overruling every decision adopting either the target
area 52 or zone of interests 53 approach to proximity. The development
of this area-a development whose unmistakable trend had been to-
ward an increasingly liberalized proximity requirement-has thus been
abruptly and rather unceremoniously halted.
B. Enforcement Nightmares
Illinois Brick portends much more than mere theoretical confusion at
esoteric heights. The decision will all but eliminate private enforce-
ment, and the most likely candidates to fill the void are neither the
states, the antitrust division of the Justice Department, nor the FTC,
but instead a new and more vigorous strain of antitrust violators.
The post-Illinois Brick antitrust defendant need no longer fear the
principal object of his Sherman Act violations-the ultimate consumer.
Only direct purchasers hold the sword of the private treble damage ac-
tion. This means that as the economy becomes more complex, thus
broadening the impact of a single antitrust violation, the risk of facing
a treble damage action decreases because the "direct purchasers" will
be middlemen reluctant to sue their suppliers. 154 This new breed of
plaintiff is not only tame but also scarce. Where once the "ancillary
force of private investigators"' 5 5 consisted of millions of consumers in
the larger industries, it now may boast only a handful of direct buyers.
The Court was willing to take the risk of reducing and even extin-
guishing private enforcement in an effort to avoid problems of proof
and multiple liability. It is true that proving an offensive pass-on is at
least as difficult 156 as proving a defensive one. But these proof
ery to the ultimate consumer while permitting the middleman a windfall recovery."' Id. at 761
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 77-90 supra.
154. See 431 U.S. at 764 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Of course, the possibility of a treble
damages recovery might be so attractive that even the most loyal and dependent buyer might
desert his supplier. But even if this were a factor in some post-Illinois Brick cases, it is an even
greater factor when the plaintiff is an indirect consumer. Indeed, one function of treble damages
is to encourage a greater number of plaintiffs to sue even though their individual claims might be
negligible. Some have argued that the direct purchaser, because of an expertise not shared by the
remote consumer, is in the better position to detect antitrust violations. See S. REP. No. 866, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) (testimony of R. Posner).
155. See Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.N.J.
1940) (describing the enforcement resource that potential treble damage plaintiffs represent).
156. Consumer plaintiffs are likely to be several steps removed from their manufacturing de-
fendants, but in a Hanover Shoe situation there is only a single step between defendant and his
direct purchaser. Naturally, as the distance over which the pass-on is to be traced increases, so do
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problems are just that-proof problems-and the possibility of a lack
of evidence should not, at the first stages of a lawsuit, preclude the
presentation of that evidence. 5 7 This is particularly true in an offen-
sive context, where the importance of private enforcement should dis-
courage early dismissals. 158 Moreover, the passing-on inquiry, while
certainly difficult, is no more difficult than a host of other determina-
tions that courts must make in antitrust cases.
It is also true that an asymmetric application of passing-on would
create serious risks of multiple liability. When a manufacturer is sued
by direct and indirect purchasers, Hanover Shoe prevents him from
proving that the direct purchasers passed on the overcharges. Recov-
ery by the indirect purchasers would therefore subject him to multiple
liability. In a complex economy, this multiple recovery problem is a
legitimate concern.
As the llinois Brick dissent points out, 9 there are a number of pro-
cedural devices that courts could employ to reduce the risk of multiple
liability. 160 However, even with the full panoply of these safeguards,
courts cannot completely eliminate the risk. 16  The question is whether
the reduced risks of multiple liability outweigh the importance of the
private treble damage action.' 62
the proof problems. Justice White recognized one sense in which offensive pass-on is more easily
proved than defensive pass-on. A Hano ver Shoe plaintiff may be injured by reduced volume even
if he is able to pass-on the entire amount of the overcharge to his purchasers. This lost volume
aspect of his injury is not present in the offensive pass-on situation. See 431 U.S. at 757 n. 13.
157. [Sltanding is a preliminary determination ordinarily to be evaluated upon the allega-
tions of the complaint. As a result, a party may make sufficient allegations to demon-
strate the necessary standing to sue but fail to prove his case on the merits .... While
we are in sympathy with the policy of limiting the breadth of Section 4, by whatever
theory, we are equally mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that summary judg-
ment "should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent
play leading roles...."
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 468 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)) (citations omitted).
158. See text accompanying notes 149-50 supra.
159. See 431 U.S. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Separate cases filed by direct and indirect purchasers could be consolidated under a
number of provisions for interdistrict transfer. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), (b), & 1407 (1976).
Statutory interpleader might also be appropriate under certain circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. §
1335 (1976); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974).
161. "As the Court says, no procedure currently exists which can eliminate the possibility [of
multiple recovery] entirely. . . ." 431 U.S. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The difficulty arises
when, after one suit has proceeded to judgment, others follow based on the same violation. Id. at
738-39.
162. Justice White disagreed with proponents of the offensive use of passing-on who "ulti-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/3
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There are good reasons to believe that the risk is acceptable. First, as
mentioned above, the risk is reducible, though the amount of that re-
duction is certainly subject to debate. More importantly, the question
is not whether a particular defendant should be saddled six-fold so that
a particular plaintiff can recover. The question is whether antitrust
wrongdoers as a group should bear the risk of multiple liability in order
to preserve the system of private enforcement.
Regardless of one's ultimate judgment about the procedural costs of
offensive passing-on, Illinois Brick unquestionably obfuscates the in-
quiry. Perhaps the Court is correct in its assessment that the risks of
multiple liability outweigh the loss in enforcement value, but its analy-
sis is neither logically pleasing nor historically accurate.
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL POSTSCRPT
In May 1978 the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 1874,
which purports to overrule both Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. The
bill, however, raises serious separation of powers and due process ques-
tions and nonconstitutional enforcement considerations.1
63
mately fall back on the argument that it is better for the defendant to pay six-fold or more dam-
ages than for an injured party to go uncompensated." Id. at 738 n.11.
163. The bill also overrules Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), discussed
in note 18 supra. Predictably, the plaintilfs bar has objected to the overruling of Hanover Shoe,
and the defendant's bar has objected to the overruling of llinois Brick. See S. REP. No. 866, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20-37 (1978). The following are the three principal sections of the bill:
Section 3. The Clayton Act is amended by inserting immediately after section 4H the
following new section:
Sec. 41(l). In any action under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act, the fact that
a person or the United States has not dealt directly with defendant shall not bar or
otherwise limit recovery.
(2) In any action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the defendant shall be entitled
to prove as partial or complete defense to a damage claim, that the plaintiff has passed
on to others, who are themselves entitled to recover under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of this
Act, some or all of what would otherwise constitute plaintiff's damage.
Section 4. The amendment made by this Act shall apply to any action commenced
under sections 4, 4A, or 4C(a)(l) of the Clayton Act which was pending on June 9, 1977,
or filed thereafter.
Section 5. Section 4 of the Clayton Act is amended by adding at the end of that section
the following new language:
Provided, however, that suits under this section brought by foreign sovereign govern-
ments, departments or agencies thereof, shall be limited to actual damages: Andprovided
further, that no foreign sovereign may maintain an action in any court of the United
States under this section unless the Attorney General of the United States, within one
hundred and twenty days after the commencement of the action has certified to the rele-
vant court, or a relevant court otherwise finds that-
(1) the United States is entitled to sue in its own name and on its own behalf on a
civil claim in the courts of such foreign sovereigns; and (2) such foreign sovereign by
its laws prohibits restrictive trade practices.
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The sections overruling Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick provide:
(1) In any action under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act, the fact
that a person or the United States has not dealt directly with the defend-
ant, shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery.
(2) In any action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the defendant shall
be entitled to prove as partial or complete defense to a damages claim, the
plaintiff has passed on to others, who are themselves entitled to recover
under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act, some or all of what would other-
wise constitute plaintiff's damage. 64
With respect to the general separation of powers question, these sec-
tions are probably constitutional. There is no problem with overruling
Illinois Brick; the Court invited Congress to do so.1 65 Congress proba-
bly has the constitutional power to overrule Hanover Shoe as well,
though this may depend on how one characterizes the nature of stand-
ing. To the extent that the standing inquiry is a constitutional one,
necessary for compliance with Article III, its scope is for the Court, not
for Congress to determine. Thus had Hanover Shoe gone the other way,
Congress would probably be unable to overrule it.166 But standing is
also a tool for the courts to regulate their dockets, though, in the case of
antitrust, this should be done with an eye toward consistency with stat-
utory purpose. While judicial restraint is certainly within the courts'
province, Congress must have a voice in determining the purposes and
reach of its own statutes.
When Congress passes laws like the Sherman or Clayton Acts, which
essentially delegate to the federal courts the duty to decide what is com-
petitively unreasonable, it should be able to later restrict that discre-
tion. Any other result would mean that Congress has the power to do
the greater-pass comprehensive antitrust legislation-but not the
lesser-place limits on its broad antitrust legislation. 67 The separation
The amendment made by this section shall apply to any action which is pending on the
date of enactment of this act or which is commenced on or after such date of enactment.
164. S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3-5 (1978).
165. 431 U.S. at 746. The Court extended a similar invitation in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251 (1972), which was accepted by Congress when it enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
See text accompanying note 132 supra.
166. Even then, if the bill were characterized as a congressional decision to remove the juris-
diction of the federal courts, it might be constitutional because Congress has exclusive power over
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850). SeeEx
parae McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). See also text accompanying notes 170-72 Infra.
167. Of course, the same could be said of the result in United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
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of powers doctrine should, therefore, pose no threat to these provisions
of S. 1874.
Another section of S. 1874, however, would make Illinois Brick and
Hanover Shoe inapplicable to pending actions as well as future ones:
Sec. 4. The amendment made by this Act shall apply to any action com-
menced under sections 4, 4A, or 4C(a)(1), of the Clayton Act which was
pending on June 9, 1977, or filed thereafter.168
While Congress may have the power to overrule Illinois Brick and
Hanover Shoe, it certainly cannot do so retroactively. Section 4 allows
Congress to invade the judicial function by attempting to prescribe a
rule of decision for pending cases. Since United States v. Klein, 169 such
an invasion has been held to violate the separation of powers doc-
trine.170 The only way Congress can retroactively overrule a Supreme
Court case is by withdrawing jurisdiction from the federal courts.17 1
Unless S. 1874 is reshaped into a withdrawal of jurisdiction, its retroac-
tivity provision will be unconstitutional.
Even if Congress redrafts S. 1874, it still may encounter some due
Wall.) 129 (1871), where the Court held that Congress could not pass an act which provided that
presidential pardons were inadmissible as proof of loyalty in post-civil war actions by southern
landowners, even though Congress has the constitutional power to abolish the lower federal courts
entirely. See also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850). But S. 1874 does not really involve
the kind of judicial tinkering which was condemned in Klein. The question of offensive and
defensive pass-on goes to the heart of antitrust policy and not to day-to-day matters of judicial
functioning. Moreover, by impairing the effect of presidential pardons, the legislation in Klein
raised an additional separation of powers conflict with the executive branch, a conflict not present
in S. 1874.
168. S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1978).
169. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 129 (1871).
170. Klein was an action under post-civil war legislation designed to give noncombatant
southern landowners rights of action for the proceeds of land sold by agents of the Union during
the war, but only if the landowner could prove his loyalty. Klein's decedent had received a presi-
dential pardon, and he obtained recovery on the basis that this pardon was proof of loyalty, a
proposition that the Supreme Court had previously adopted. United States v. Padelford, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869). However, before the United States could appeal the judgment, Con-
gress sought to overrule Padelford by passing an act which provided that pardons were inadmissi-
ble as proof of loyalty. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235. The Court held that the
overruling statute was an unconstitutional infringement of the judicial power.
We are directed to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the judgment must be affirmed,
because of a pardon granted to the intestate of the claimants .... Can we do so without
allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the judicial department of
the government in cases pending before it
We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the leg-
islative from the judicial power.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147-48.
171. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
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process problems. Though Congress is free to withdraw the jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts, the withdrawal itself must not violate
due process. 172 At least one commentator has argued that section 4 of
S. 1874 violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment by ex-
tinguishing the rights of direct-purchaser plaintiffs in pending actions
to recover against defendants who have passed on overcharges.173 The
provision may similarly violate the due process rights of pending de-
fendants because they would then be subject to suits by indirect pur-
chasers. 174 These arguments assume that vested rights are involved,' 75
yet it is unlikely that any court would consider the right to recover
against a particular defendant a vested right. Theoretically, at least, S.
1874 does not take away any plaintiff's cause of action; rather it limits,
in some circumstances, the plaintiff's choice of defendants. A similar
analysis applies to defendants. The bill does not expose to suit any
defendant who is not now subject to it. It merely expands the class of
plaintiffs to whom a defendant may be liable. Because the retroactivity
issue, as a due process question, is governed by general considerations
of arbitrariness or unreasonableness,1 76 section 4 will probably pass
due process muster.1 77
The most disturbing nonconstitutional aspect of S. 1874 is that it sim-
ply sets the law of antitrust standing back to 1960 without any guidance
on the question of proximity. Subsection 1 provides only that indirect
purchasers shall not be barred by virtue of their indirect status, but it
does not indicate how far down the supply chain liability extends. One
of the few virtues of Illinois Brick was that it laid this difficult proxim-
ity question to rest. The passage of S. 1874 would re-ignite the con-
troversy.
Assuming that some traditional proximity limitation will survive S.
172. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1948) (construing the Por-
tal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 28 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1976)):
[W]hile Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction
of the courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or to take
private property without just compensation. (footnotes omitted)
173. See S. REP. No. 866, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978) (memorandum of M. Handler),
174. Id.
175. See Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338 (1922).
176. See United States v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
177. Two more constitutional objections are clearly without merit. Though U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cL 3 prohibits Congress from passing ex post facto laws, it applies only to retroactive criminal
legislation. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1789). And the contracts clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 10, cl. 1, only prohibits states from impairing contractual obligations. Sinking Fund Cases, 99
U.S. 700 (1878).
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1874, ultimate consumers will not only bepermitted to sue remote vio-
lators, they will be forced to do so because the pass-on defense will
protect direct sellers and middlemen. This might have an adverse effect
on private enforcement because consumers would be faced with the
difficult task of tracing overcharges through the supply chain. A funda-
mental premise of Hanover Shoe was that plaintiffs should have the
option of suing their direct buyers instead of being forced to deal with
complex questions of economic structure.
In short, private enforcement stands to lose ground in S. 1874's pro-
posed trade-off between Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. Though the
bill creates a large class of potential plaintiffs, it saddles those plaintiffs
with the burden of proving indirect losses and prohibits them from su-
ing the very people with whom they deal and with whom they are most
familiar. 178
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps Illinois Brick is just another act in the institutional
play-part of the continuing process by which the two branches are
distributing their antitrust power. Unfortunately, Justice White's opin-
ion indicates that the Court may have reached an antitrust watershed
and that it intends to cut back drastically on the private enforcement
mechanism, the intent of Congress notwithstanding. This would be a
dangerous state of affairs, not only because the Court would be avoid-
ing its constitutional responsibilities to Congress, but also because it
would be ignoring three decades of development which the lower fed-
eral courts have contributed to the concept of proximity. That would
be particularly unfortunate and ironic because it was the Court's own
reluctance to enter the field which spawned much of this development.
Even more disturbing is the prospect of a congressional overreaction.
With one blow S. 1874 would retroactively overrule three Supreme
Court cases and in so doing would set the law of antitrust standing
back eighteen years. To be sure, those eighteen years were full of con-
fusion, but the confusion was born of necessity, and the same problems
that faced the Hanover Shoe Court in 1960 are sure to reappear if S.
1874 passes unamended.
At the heart of both the judicial reaction and the congressional over-
reaction is the same unswerving belief that courts should apply offen-
178. See S. REP. No. 866, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (testimony of R. Posner).
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sive and defensive passing-on symmetrically. Perhaps it is time to
reexamine the notion that these two kinds of passing-on-which are so
different in origin, purpose, and historical development-should some-
how be applied equally. A look at what symmetry has wrought-first
Illinois Brick and now S. 1874-should at least raise some doubts.
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